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Insurance-Construction of Contract Malum Prohibitum.-[Federal]
Appellant insurance company insured the respondent administrator's deceased
intestate against accidental death tinder a double indemnity provision making
the company liable in the event that "death shall not have resulted from
bodily injuries sustained while participating in aviation or aeronautics except
as a fare paying passenger." Insured, while flying over northern California
in search of a missing brother, was killed in the crash of a private plane
owned and flown by the holder of a federal private pilot's license, which per-
mitted the licensee to pilot a plane in private flight but specifically prohibited
the flying of aircraft for hire. A California statute made it a misdemeanor
for a pilot to operate a plane in any manner except that for which he had been
licensed by the government. Insured paid the pilot no fare before the flight,
but respondent argued on the trial of this case that there was an implied con-
tract between the insured and the pilot for the payment of such fare and that
this implication constituted insured a fare paying passenger, thus bringing the
insured's death within the coverage of the policy. The jury found that there
was an implied contract with the pilot for payment, which finding was
adopted by the District Court and made the basis for its decision. Held:
on appeal, reversed. No contract can be created by an attempted agreement
for the services of a person required to be licensed under California law for
the protection of the person to be served, nor implied from a request for an
acceptance of such unlicensed services. Metropolitan Life Insurance Cmpany
v. Amos Halcomb, as Administrator of the Estate of George R. Halcomb,
deceased, 79 F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 9th, Nov. 4, 1935), 235 C. C. H. 507. A
consideration of decisions handed down involving contracts made in viola-
tion of a statute reveals the widely adopted rule that a contract, such as the
one implied in the instant case for the insured to pay the pilot for operating
the plane, was a service malum prohibitum,l which the courts have thrown
into the same contractual category as agreements malum in sc,2 and held
that such contracts are not voidable but entirely void.3 As the status of a
person on a carrier as a passenger is dependent entirely on the contractual
duty of such person to pay for the transportation, then the California deci-
sions cited by the respondent 4 that a person not in pari delicto, who cannot
recover upon a void contract, may have other relief, are of no consequence
here. These cases obviously would be direct authority in a suit by thei
insured for the recovery of any money paid the pilot, assuming that such
had been paid and the trip had been safely completed, but such authority has
1. Kryle v. Frank Holton & Co., 217 Wis. 628, 259 N. W. 828 (1934).
Jessewich v. Abbene, 277 N. Y. Supp. 599, 154 Misc. 768 (1934).
2. Seminole Phosphate Co. v. Johnson, 188 N. C. 419, 124 S. E. 859 (1924).
3. Baxter v. City of Venice. 194 Ill. App. 62, 111 N. E. 111 (1915) ; Baker
v. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 206 P. 553 (1922) The Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing
Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162 Pac. 31 (1916) see Clark on Contracts, third edition,
page 322.
4. Hammemeon v. Amalgamated Copper Mines Co., 95 Cal. App. 400, 402;
Becker v. Stineman, 115 Cal. App. 740, 745.
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no effect whatsoever in the determination of the status of the insured as a
passenger, and the court was justified in refusing to consider it in the opinion.
Two California cases directly in point with the issue herein involved 5
further substantiate the position taken by the court in the instant decision in
holding that a contract made in violation of a statutory provision requiring
a license or certificate as a prerequisite to engaging in the business of which
the contract was an incident, is void in all cases where the statute in question
was designed "to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular
business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the public." Even were
the validity of an agreement between the pilot and passenger is to be determined
by the federal law, the result would not vary from that necessitated by the
California cases; for the United States Supreme Court declared in the early
case of Harris v. Runnels,6 which still stands as the adopted holding of this
tribunal, that a promise made upon a consideration which is rendered in
violation of a statute is void.
The fact that the decision in the instant case followed so closely on the
heels of the case of Gregory v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
York 7 which overruled a long line of consistent authority on the interpreta-I
tion of "participation" aeronautic liability exception clauses8 and adopted a
radically different rule as to such interpretation, the query naturally arise'
as to what effect, if any, the decision' in the Gregory case would have had on
the result here reached if such decision had been available to counsel at thd
time briefs were filed in the instant case.
As the court in the Gregory decision held under a very similar state-
ment of facts as are here involved that a passenger killed in the crash of a,
private plane whose policy contained a "participation in aeronautics" liability.
exception clause, was not "participating in aeronautics" within the meaning
of such exception, it appears on first consideration as though the decision,
would have afforded a first line of offense to the respondent in the instant
case, which, if he had proved it, would have concluded the case in his favor.
However, it is submitted, that it is not only possible but plausible, on the
basis of adopted rules of policy construction and on the reasoning ofi thel
court in the Gregory case itself, to distinguish between the two cases, and to
thus conclude that the result of the Halcomb case would not have been i
affected had the Gregory case been available for consideration in the instant,
decision.
The Gregory case mentions with approval the addition of the words "as
a passenger or otherwise" to the "participation" exception clauses and cites
with approval the recent case of Goldsmith v. New York Life Insurance Corn-
5. Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P. 825 (1907) ; Wood v. Krepps, 168
Cal. 382,' 143 P. 691 (1914).
6. 53 U. S. 79 (1851).
7. 79 F. (2d) 522 (1935).
8. Bew v. Travelers Insurance Company, 95 N. J. Rep. 533, 112 Atl. 859(1921) ; Travelers Insurance Company v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 (1921) ;
Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Association. 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W.
976 (1923) ; Pittman V. Lamar Life Insurance Company, 17 F. (2d) 270 (C.
C. A. 5th. 1927) ; Tierney v. Occidental Life Insurance Company, 89 Cal. App.
779, 265 Pac. 400 (1928) Heat et al. v. New York Life Insurance, 43 F. (2d)"
517 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; First National Bank of Chatanooga v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Company, 62 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) ; Martin v. Mutual
Life Insurance Company of New York, 189 Ark. 291. 71 S. W. 694 (1934) ; Mis-
souri State Insurance Comp.sny v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d) .1081
(1934): Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Association, Inc., - N. M. -,
39 P. (2d) 1023 (1935).
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pany9 which held that the addition of the words "as a passenger or otherwise"
to an "engaged" exception clause included a passenger on a plane. This
interpretation was a rather radical upheaval in the general trend of policy
interpretation as it overruled a long line of cases10 holding with a marked
degree of unanimity that "engaged" had the connotation of frequency and
continuity in dealing with the instrumentality and therefore could not be
interpreted to mean a mere passenger. Thus it is evident from these two
recent cases that words specifically listing a passenger in an exclusion clause
are all-important, and as a re-phrasing of the exception clause in the instant
case made such clause read to the effect that the insured was not covered for
accidental death while flying in an airplane "except while participating in aero-
nautics as a fare paying passenger" it is easily distinguishable from the
Gregory case as to fact and approved by the decisions in both the Gregory
and Goldsmith cases.
FRED M. GLAss. 1 '
DIGESTS
Insurance-Construction of "Participation in Aviation" Clause.-
[Federal] On October 28, 1935, the Supreme Court of the United States
denied the petition of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
for a writ of certiorari from the federal C. C. A. for the Eighth Circuit.
For comment ov the C. C. A. decision in Gregory et al. v. Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company of New York, see 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 626 (1935).
9. 69 F. (2d) 273 (1934).
10. Benefit Association of Railway Employees v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565, 299
S. W. 995 (1927) ; Gits v. New, York Life Insurance Company, 32 F. (2d) 7
(C. C. A. 7th, 1929) Price v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 98 Fla. 1044,,
124 So. 817 (1929) Masonic Association Insurance Company v. Jackson, 200
Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628 (1929) ; Charette V. Prudential Life Insurance Company,
202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848 (1930) ; Flanders v. Benefit Association of Railway
Employees, 226 Mo. App. 143, 42 S. W. ("d) 973 (1931) Blonski v. Bankers
Life Insurance Company, 209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410 (1932) Irwin v. Prudential
Life Insurance Company, 5 F. Supp. 382 (1933) ; Provident Trust Company of
Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Society of the United States, 316 Pa. St. Rep.
121, 172 Atl. 701 (1934) ; Mayer v. New York Life Insurance Company, 74 F.
(2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th. 1934).
11. Mr. Glass is a graduate student in Northwestern University School
of Law.
